Abstract-Recent years have seen a large number of proposals affect personal security and mobility. Most recently, we have for anonymity mechanisms operating on the application layer. seen a remarkable upswing of privacy intrusions driven by Given that anonymity is no stronger than its weakest link, attempts to perform identity theft. It is evident that location such proposals are only meaningful if one can offer anonymity information may be used to better target victims of such guarantees on the communication layer as well. ANODRor ANonymous On Demand Routing -is one of the leading attacks, as well as attacks in the entire spectrum mentioned proposals to deal with this issue. In this paper, we propose a above. To limit the success of such attacks -without having novel technique to address the same problem, but at a lower to re-engineer our entire communication infrastructure -it cost. Our proposal, which we dub Discount-ANODR, is buit is important to develop techniques that implement sufficient around the same set of techniques as ANODR is. Our proposal is im prtantt deveop tehnique stattimlementesuf has the benefit of achieving substantially lower computation and levelsof privac, thoutandingsubstantialschanes of communication complexities at the cost of a slight reduction the network orthe computationalrequirements associatedwith of privacy guarantees. In particular, Discount-ANODR achieves performing routing. source anonymity and routing privacy. A route is "blindly gener-
In our protocol, when a node wants to learn a path to a that the routing path and length in Crowds is dynamic, not destination, it locally broadcasts a route request, which will like the static or preset paths in mix-based solutions. be propagated to the destination node over one or more hops.
Kong and Hong proposed an solution, named ANODR, Once the destination node receives the request, it responds for anonymous on demand routing in mobile ad hoc netwith a route reply to the node it received the request from. works [15] . Our approach bears some similarity to the onion An intermediary receiving a reply first appends its identity. construction of ANODR, but is different in the following Then it chooses a symmetric secret key to re-encrypt the ways. First, ANODR uses public cryptography to exchange message. The result is sent to the next intermediary on the way the pseudonym for each hop en route, but our approach only to the initiator of the request. Finally, the initiator obtains a employs symmetric building block. Second, each route discovroute reply encrypted layer-by-layer, like an onion, by all the ery in ANODR causes a global onion-construction flooding intermediaries on the route. The discovered route is stored in (all directions) in the networks, and each node receiving the the route cache. When a source intends to send a message to a route request tries to open a trap-door function by performing destination, it selects the corresponding onion from the route a symmetric decryption and a comparison operation. If a cache, appends it to the payload, and forwards the assembled node is not the destination, it will add another layer to the packet to the next hop according to the information in the received onion by performing a symmetric encryption, and route cache. An intermediary learns the next hop by peeling then broadcast the updated onion. In our approach, onions are off its layer of the onion using its secret key. It is important constructed in only one direction -on the return route. Third, to note that our protocol does not require any key exchange. the trap-door design in ANODR requires a key distribution In fact, a node can choose its secret key arbitrarily.
process, and each sender must know the trap-door key of the recipient in order to start a route request. Our approach does B. Outline not require any key distribution. Finally, a potential drawback We begin by describing our work in general and covering of ANODR is lack ofterminating condition, i.e., large amount some related work in Section II. We then detail our com-of requests will be propagated in the network for a long time. munication model and adversary model in Section III. In Traditional routing protocols solve this problem by setting a Section IV, we describe the protocols for route discovery, maximum propagating limit to each request [13] . However, message sending, and route maintenance. Privacy properties a hop counter tells the adversary how far he is away from and the cost of the protocol are analyzed in Section V and VI. the originator. Hence it does not work in a protocol aiming Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
at privacy preserving. We address the problem of surviving onions in a simple and practical way in this paper. II. RELATED WORK While ANODR achieves good privacy by providing sender Privacy-related communication has applications on the In-anonymity, recipient anonymity, and unlinkability, it has a ternet [6] , [7] , [19] , [18] , [21] , ad hoc networks [15] , hybrid much higher overhead in computation, communication, and networks [3] , and sensor networks [14] . Some solutions focus storage than our approach due to the above operations. In on sender anonymity [4], [5] , [6] , [7] , [19] , [20] , [21] , other particular, for a route of eight hops, ANODR adds around 1.6 schemes provide recipient anonymity [22] discovery, while our approach only increases 0.17 millisecond Chaum proposed a so-called mix to achieve source to perform such a route discovery. It is not clear whether anonymity [4] . A mix accepts a number of messages from ANODR is applicable in cases of frequent communications different sources, performs cryptographic transformations on (among users) and high mobility due to it takes a long time to the messages, and forwards the messages to the next desti-find route. ANODR can be used in cases requiring high level nation in a random order. Mixes make tracking a particular privacy, e.g., military and intelligence. Our approach is more message either in bit-pattern, size, or ordering with other efficient and provides acceptable privacy. messages difficult. Onion routing is an early and independent Capkun, Hubaux, and Jakobsson design an approach by implementation of the notion of a mix network on the Internet changing node pseudonyms and cryptographic keys to achieve by Goldschlag, Reed, and Syverson [6], [7] , [19] . In onion privacy in hybrid ad hoc networks [3] . They make each node routing the initiator of a connection creates an onion, defining be able to sign a verifiable message, but no one can tell who the path of the connection through the network. Each onion signed it except the central authority. The approach in [3] router along the path learns its successor and some other can not be applied to ad hoc network where there is no information by peeling off one layer of the onion with its central authority. Like other public-key oriented protocols, private key, and the data arrives at the destination in plaintext. their approach achieves privacy by adding a huge computation Mix and onion routing are based on public cryptography. In burden and complexity to the network.
order to build onions defining meaningful routes the onion Blaze, Ioannidis, and Keromytis et al, proposed WAR proxy is required to know the network topology and public (Wireless Anonymous Routing) in [2] . WAR works in cases certificates of routing nodes. Crowds [20] is a web-oriented where all nodes are in direct communication range of each anonymizing approach for synchronous communications. The other. It relies on public cryptography and has an expensive main difference between Crowds and mix-based solutions is key distribution mechanism. Although periodically sending symmetric keys is not time consuming, the receivers need to the network. All nodes are willing to cooperate in the network decrypt these keys with their private keys. Another problem operation. Nodes do not exchange local topology information of WAR is there is no route discovery. A source selects with their neighbors who are within direct communication intermediaries to a destination at random, and encapsulates range. A message is propagated from the source to the the payload by an iterated encryption approach. It is hard to destination over one or more hops. Each node in the network imagine that a randomly selected route will be a valid path has a unique identity, and it chooses an arbitrary secret key to a destination, given that the source has no knowledge of which is not shared with any other node. The communication the topology of the network. Thus, a source channels message between two nodes is bidirectional, i.e., if node A can reach to a destination in a blindly-flooding way. Unlike WAR, our node B, then B can reach A. approach works in multi-hop situations and has a clear way to perform route discovery.
B. Adversary Model Waters, Felten, and Sahai introduce the "incomparable" 1) Assumption: We let A be an adversary controlling one public keys to achieve receiver anonymity [22] . In their work, or more nodes in the network. We assume: a receiver is able to create many public keys corresponding 2) Goals of the adversary. There are two goals of an Unfortunately, they do not provide privacy protection for either adversary A. The first goal is to learn the identity of a message route discovery or communication. In both DSR and AODV, originator. The second goal is to infer identities of all nodes a route request identifies the source and destination and the along a route. If an adversary achieves both the first and the hop-count the request has traveled so far. A route request of second goals, he is naturally able to associate two nodes as DSR even records the sequence of nodes as it is propagated communication partners. to the destination. A route response of DSR includes all
We say a protocol achieves source anonymity if A is not able intermediaries between the source and destination in plaintext. to find evidence that a node was the originator of a specified In AODV, each entry in the route table contains the number message. Moreover, we say a protocol provides route secrecy of hops to different destinations.
if A can not attain the second goal with a probability nonThere are a number of ways to compromise the privacy of negligibly higher than a random guess from a group of candi-DSR and AODV. For example, an adversary is able to learn the dates. Furthermore, we say a protocol provides pair-anonymity identities of all intermediaries by just eavesdropping in DSR. if A can not link two nodes as communication partners from Long time eavesdropping allows him to learn the topology of routing evidence. This feature follows automatically from the the network. Eavesdropping also allows an adversary to learn first two properties.
the topology of the network in AODV.
3) Possible attacks: An adversary may use several methods -either passive or active -to achieve one or both of the goals A. Communication Model described above. We assume the network to be a mobile ad hoc network.
. Thacing: an adversary tries to trace the route by controlNodes in the network can either be devices with regular ling one or more compromised nodes close or en route. computation ability, like laptops, or lesser computation ability, . Timing attacks: an adversary tries to guess its distance to like pocket PCs (PDAs), or devices with low computation and the source or destination by observing timings associated storage ability, like sensors. Nodes are distributed uniformly in with the repeated use of same onions. and sends (e5, n5, rid) to n4, from which n5 received the route request with rid. The route response is encrypted layer by layer by intermediaries n4, n3, n2 and n1 when traveling from containing entries of (Si, rid), where Si is a neighbor from D to S. Each layer of the encryption contains an identity of the which ni received a request with rid. Li will be used later next intermediary to D. Finally, S receives a path to D in form for route reply propagation. A destination constructs a route of (el, in1, rid). It then adds an entry (D, e1, n1) to its route reply by encrypting a binary string PD with random length cache. Figure 1 shows the big picture of our approach, and between 0 to k bits, where k can be adjusted according Figure 2 shows the details of route discovery. For simplicity, to the network situation. The process of route discovery includes the following three null or in the form of (path, nexthop), where path is an stages: encrypted route. We note that the propagation of route requests 1) Request origination: A source S initiates a route request will continue for a long time if not controlled. DSR uses a hop to a destination D by selecting a rid and locally broadcasting counter (recording how many hops a request has traveled) to a route request REQ =(rid, , D).
solve this problem. A route request will be dropped if its hop 2) Request resolution. The process of request resolution is counter is greater than some upper limit. Such an approach can shown in Figure 3 . not be used here because a hop counter tells an observer how Each node maintains a PROCESSEDREQ to record the far he is from the request originator. To overcome this problem, rids already processed in order to avoid repeated transmission we let each node flip a biased-coin (denoted by Flip(bcoiin)) of the same requests. A node ini also maintains a list Li to determine whether to retransmit a request. For example, if Here Ps is a 0-1 string chosen by S with a random length Fig. 4 . Steps of response transmission between 0-k bits, and rs is the most inner layer of the route from the D to S. We note ei can be only used to route Each node maintains a MYREQ to record the rids of messages from S to D due to its encryption order. Therefore, ( unaware of the identities of the source and nodes other than its predecessor and successor along the route. Our protocol has the benefit of achieving substantially lower can be found in Gj(p), then nj is the destination of message computation and communication complexities at the cost of a M; otherwise it just helps re-transmit the message to the next slight reduction in privacy guarantees. In particular, Discounthop indicated by the decrypted result. ANODR achieves source anonymity, routing privacy, and and Figure 7 is an example of sending a message, where the pair-anonymity. We show that route privacy is well preserved message M, originated from S, travels through node nl, n2, if less than half of nodes en route or close to a route are n3, n4, and n5 to arrive at the destination D. We see that compromised. Intermediaries only know the destination of the a return route r5 has been established by the intermediaries request and the identity of the previous intermediary, but not if when M arrives at D. This returning route is used to send the latter was the originator of the request. To some extent, our back an acknowledgement or a message to the originator when protocol also protects the locations of nodes in the network necessary.
when protecting their identities. In the following statements, (M, i r (M, e2 ri) ( We use an end-to-end scheme to maintain the route. After to eavesdrop on passing messages. receiving a message from a source, D assembles an acknowlIf all nodes along a route are disclosed by the adversary, edgement ack and appends the return route ri, then it sends we say the route is fully traced; otherwise the route is said to back the acknowledgement to the hop from which it received be partially traced, or un-traced (no node en route is traced). the original message. The ack will be propagated back to the Here we define a metric -trace ratio -as the fraction of hops source, where each intermediary removes a layer of the return being traced en route. route by decrypting the route with its secret key. We demonstrate the trace ratio of our protocol by investi-0.6 gating a route with 8 hops (Figure 9) The above analysis and the results in Figure 10 show that (b) Non-consecutive compromising the lower bound for A to fully trace a route requires A to compromise the number of nodes en route or close to a Fig. 10 . Trace ratio corresponding to different types of colluding route. In other words, if less than e = of nodes en route or 2 close to a route are compromised, the adversary is not able to fully trace the route. with an onion during message transmission will cause the 2) Other attacks: Finally we discuss counter-measures to next intermediary to not be able to decrypt the onion, other attacks described in section III-B.
and therefore drop the message. All these attacks do not . Timing attacks can be thwarted by introducing a random help an adversary identify the source, or trace a route delay before message re-transmission. Timing attacks do in use. The tampering can be prevented by enforcing not help the adversary gain the identities of source or authentication, which is an orthogonal topic to our paper.
intermediaries.
. Packet dropping or injecting: When a message gets . Onion recording: Repeated onions allow an adversary to dropped, the source usually re-sends the message. If a learn that several messages might have been originated node injects a route request to the network, it will receive from a same source (the cached onion may be used by a route response from a destination. If a node injects different nodes), but they do not identify the source. Such invalid onions to the network, the onions will be dropped a threat can be reduced if we shorten the life-time of by other nodes (unable to decrypt). Both packet dropping cached onions. and injecting do not help an adversary to achieve his . Tampering: An adversary may tamper with a route regoals. quest, a route response, or an encrypted onion. Tampering BCoprsnfpivcfetesoohrpoool with a route request may cause the request be dropped or be propagated to a wrong destination. Tampering a route From analysis of Section Ill-B we see both DSR and response may cause an originator to not be able to receive AODV provide almost no privacy. For example, an eavesthe response, or to receive an invalid response. Tampering dropper en route or close to a route learns identities of all and ANODR on the following facts and assumptions: and 62kb respectively. The communication costs of ANODR . Nodes are uniformly distributed in the network, and the and our approach are 417kb resp. 81 kb.
average travel distance of a route request is 10 hops. By analysis, we identify two reasons responsible for the . For ANODR, the field length of source, destination, and big difference in costs between our approach and ANODR.
route pseudonym is 128 bits. The length of the other One is that ANODR adopts public cryptography, but we do nonce is 40 bits. Let the average size of onions be 600 not. Another reason is related to the use of onion encryption. bits. For our protocol, the length of the identifier of a node Onions are encrypted on the way out in ANODR [15], i.e., is 40 bits, which is the same as the nonce in ANODR. from the request initiator to every direction in the network, The size of an acknowledgment is 40 bits. while the onion encryption occurs only on the returning way . When public-key encryption is used, we assume the use in our approach.
of ECAES (160-bit key), with an encryption time of To understand the big difference between ANODR and our 160ms, and decryption time of 42ms. When symmetric protocol, it is worth to take a look at the two approaches encryption is used, we assume the use of AES (128-bit in more detail. Figure 1 and 11 show the processes of route key & block). The encryption/decryption speed of AES discovery from S to D in the two protocols. In Figure 1 , a is 29.1/29.2Mbps. The above computation time is based route is constructed on the return path by D and intermediaries on iPAQ3670 pocket PC with Intel StrongARM 206MHz n5, n4, n3, n2 and n1. Each intermediary adds one layer to CPU. the received onion. Onions only occur on the return path. * The maximum packet size for the three protocols is 1500 However, in Figure 11 , the onion is a part of a route request.
bytes. The channel capacity is 2 Mbits/second. (Windows As the route requests travel away from S, onions get bigger systems are limited to a maximum payload size of 1380 and bigger (more layers). They are propagated in all directions bytes for TCP packets.) from S without any explicit terminating condition. assumptions above, for a path with 8 hops, the route discovery in a network with the same topology as in Figure I and 11.
time can be estimated to be 4.82 milliseconds.
In WAR, S selects multiple intermediaries at random. Such 2) Overhead of ANODR and our approach. We compare randomness is just like no route discovery or "blind" flooding. the overhead of computation, storage, and communication Given that S has no knowledge of the network topology in this ' '~~~~~~multi-hop environment,Scan not find a route to D. between our approach and ANODR for a route discovery m with a length of 8 hops. The computation overhead refers to how much time is spent on public-key and symmetric-key encryptions and decryptions; storage overhead refers to how
We use the same assumption as in Section VI-A to estimate much space is required to keep secrets, public/private keys, the length of control bytes of the protocols when sending a lists, and pseudonyms, etc; communication overhead refers to message, i.e., 8 hops route, 600 bits onion on average, 128 the amount of data being sent through the network. Using bits route pseudonym. The comparison of control ratios with the above assumptions, the computation time of ANODR is DSR, ANODR, and our approach is summarized in Table I. o----O 
